Should the federal government bail out the states? Lessons from past recessions by Richard H. Mattoon
Should the federal government bail out the states? Lessons from 
past recessions
by Richard H. Mattoon, senior economist and economic advisor
Like the economy in general, individual state economies are struggling in this recession. 
State governments face significant constraints in raising additional revenues. Most states 
are required to balance their budgets regardless of the economic environment. This article 
considers the role of the federal government in helping the states to manage their ﬁ  nances.
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Three factors are particularly 
important in evaluating the 
effectiveness of federal 
antirecessionary aid to 
states—timing, triggers, 
and targeting.
State government budget woes have been 
much in the news. Recently, California 
projected a $21 billion deﬁ  cit after fail-
ing to get voter approval for a series of 
budget balancing ﬁ  scal measures.1 In 
January of this year, ﬁ  ve prominent 
Democratic governors suggested that 
the federal government should commit 
$1 trillion in aid to the states over the 
next two years.2 The rationale for such 
ﬁ  nancial support is that states (which 
are generally prohibited from running 
deﬁ  cits) need the money to maintain 
key programs, such as Medicaid, un-
employment insurance, and work force 
training, for which demand rises during 
a recession. Also, this aid might help 
states avoid enacting spending cuts or tax 
increases that could deepen or prolong 
the economic downturn.
Should the federal government have a 
role in helping the states through a reces-
sion? In this Chicago Fed Letter, I review 
some of the issues that need to be consid-
ered when constructing an aid package 
that targets state governments during 
an economic downturn. Three factors 
are particularly important in evaluating 
the effectiveness of such federal aid to 
states—timing, triggers, and targeting.
The purpose and structure of aid
The idea of federal support for state 
(and local) governments in a downturn 
is hardly a new one. For example, in 
response to the recession of 1973–75,3 
Congress enacted the Antirecession 
Fiscal Assistance (ARFA) program, 
which was combined with general 
revenue sharing grants and the Local 
Public Works (LPW) program to provide 
unrestricted grants and infrastructure 
funding to the states. In addition, 
Congress had passed the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
in 1973, and in conjunction with these 
other programs, it became an antire-
cessionary mechanism for delivering 
job training. More recently, in 2003, 
Congress passed the Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, as states 
dealt with a slow recovery from the 
2001 recession. 
The purpose of such funding is primarily 
to stabilize ﬁ  scal behavior in the state 
government sector. This aid is intended 
to smooth the budgetary actions states 
would be forced to take in the face of 
declining revenues and increasing de-
mands from programs such as Medicaid 
and unemployment insurance. The 
federal government sometimes adds an 
infrastructure element to its aid as a way 
of increasing demand in the construction 
sector and stimulating the economy. 
However, economic stimulus is clearly 
a secondary objective of this aid. If the 
federal government’s primary purpose In the case of the 1973–75 recession, a signiﬁ  cant portion 
of federal government aid was received by the states during 
economic recovery and may have contributed to post-recession 
inﬂ  ationary pressures.
were to provide an economic stimulus, it 
would be better off simply spending the 
money directly rather than attempting 
to funnel it through the states.
Is there a right way to provide aid?
Extensive evaluations were conducted 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO), 
and the U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁ  ce 
(GAO)4 to assess the federal govern-
ment’s aid package in response to the 
1973–75 recession. In general, the re-
ports were critical of the effectiveness 
of the aid programs. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
Treasury’s report found that the aid to 
the states arrived after the recession had 
already bottomed out and did little to 
forestall states from taking budgetary 
actions that likely exacerbated the re-
cession.5 In addition, a signiﬁ  cant por-
tion of the aid was received during the 
subsequent economic recovery and may 
have contributed to post-recession inﬂ  a-
tionary pressures.6 Finally, it appears 
that some states failed to spend the 
money and instead put the aid toward 
rebuilding state budget balances dur-
ing the recovery.7 
Timing of aid
For federal antirecessionary aid to be 
effective, it must be timed to counter 
the economic effects associated with a 
decline in the business cycle.8 This is 
easier said than done. Ideally, the aid 
should start arriving to the states shortly 
after the peak in the cycle and be dis-
continued either once a recovery has 
begun or when a recovery has been 
ﬁ  rmly established. In addition, there is 
the issue of whether the amount of aid 
should be scaled to reﬂ  ect the severity 
of the downturn. Ideally, the level of aid 
would be recalibrated during each quar-
ter to reﬂ  ect the cyclical stress being 
felt by the states; this is preferable to 
the aid being distributed as a lump sum.
Another issue with timing is recognizing 
the lags in distributing the aid. Unless 
there is an automatic mechanism for 
triggering aid, the ﬁ  rst lag is often the 
time it takes to secure passage of an aid 
bill by Congress. Consider the current 
circumstances: The National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) dates the 
current recession as having begun in 
December 2007; and the aid package 
was enacted in February 2009.9 So, nearly 
ﬁ  ve quarters had passed before aid be-
came available to the states. The second 
lag is the time it takes for the federal 
government to distribute the aid money 
to the states. Further, the states often 
have to set up mechanisms for channeling 
the funds into the necessary programs. 
All of this slows the process of spending 
the money during the recession. In the 
GAO’s assessment of the aid programs en-
acted in response to the 1973–75 reces-
sion, it was found that about 50% of the 
federal money appropriated had actually 
been spent by the states, even after the 
recession ended.10 The balance went to 
either build a surplus or reduce the state’s 
deﬁ  cit. In the case of the Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 
the federal funds were ﬁ  rst distributed 
19 months after the end of the recession.11
Triggers for aid
In the case of the 1973–75 recession, 
the federal relief programs used three 
triggers based on unemployment. Aid 
under the ARFA program was provided 
when a jurisdiction’s unemployment 
threshold rose above 4.5%. Aid from the 
LPW program was based on the total 
number of persons unemployed, as well 
as the number unemployed in excess of 
6.5%, in that jurisdiction. And aid under 
CETA was prompted by all three triggers.12
The use of the unemployment rate as 
a trigger has a number of advantages. 
First, the unemployment rate is readily 
available at both the state and local level, 
so it can be used to direct aid in a more 
focused manner—even potentially to 
steer aid to speciﬁ  c metropolitan areas 
within states. Second, it is available on 
a monthly basis. However, in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the federal govern-
ment’s aid package of the mid-1970s, the 
GAO found that the structural change 
built into national labor markets caused 
this trigger to turn on well into the down-
turn and maintain aid well into the re-
covery.13 The money was not expended for 
three to four quarters after the start of 
the recession. It is not clear whether this 
delay was excessive. However, the inability 
to turn off the trigger possibly contrib-
uted to inﬂ  ation during the recovery.
If unemployment is not an optimal trig-
ger, what other triggers might be con-
sidered? A frequent candidate is the full 
employment output gap (the difference 
between actual gross domestic product, 
or GDP, and potential output). The ad-
vantage of this trigger is that a decline 
in real GDP below its full employment 
level is one of the clearest indicators of 
a recession. However, data problems make 
the use of this trigger difﬁ  cult. First, initial 
and preliminary estimates of GDP are 
produced with a signiﬁ  cant lag and are 
subject to signiﬁ  cant revisions. Also, sub-
national and metropolitan estimates are 
less readily available. Finally, there is 
something less than full consensus on 
how to calculate potential GDP.14 
Other triggers that have been consid-
ered include declines in the index of 
industrial production and personal in-
come. Each of these measures changes 
the duration of aid over the business 
cycle. Each one also has its drawbacks. 
A trigger based on industrial production 
tends to produce shorter durations of 
aid; and at least once (in 1966–67) in-
dustrial production fell because of tight 
monetary policy and not because of a 
recession. Real personal income (ex-
cluding transfer payments) appears to 
perform fairly well in terms of triggering 
aid at the onset of a recession, but has 
a spotty performance in terms of the 
duration of aid, often ending too soon. 
Given that neither of these alternatives 
is ideal, the use of the unemployment 
rate as a trigger does not seem to have 
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Perhaps the poorest targeting was evidenced in the 2003 
aid package. Federal money was distributed to the states 
on a per capita basis without consideration of any local 
economic conditions. 
The aid should also take into consider-
ation trends in each state’s budget. If the 
onset of a deﬁ  cit is caused by a recession-
related drop in revenues, supporting the 
state’s budget through federal government 
aid is appropriate. However, if the state 
has a structural deﬁ  cit caused by an in-
efﬁ  cient tax system and/or unsupportable 
public spending, aid should be measured 
so as not to reward poor ﬁ  scal behavior. 
An Economic Policy Institute report sug-
gested that an indicator of state ﬁ  scal ca-
pacity should be used, such as the state’s 
ability to raise revenue through its taxable 
resource base or its relative wealth as mea-
sured by per capita gross state product.15 
Perhaps the poorest targeting was evi-
denced in the 2003 aid package. Federal 
money was distributed on a per capita ba-
sis without consideration of any local 
economic conditions. As a result, 38 states 
received identical per capita aid amounts 
of $34.01. In its evaluation of the aid 
package, the GAO used indicators of 
the magnitude of the recession, such 
as the percentage change in nonfarm 
Targeting of aid
How should aid be targeted? If the prin-
ciple is to provide aid on the basis of 
the recession’s level of impact on states 
(and localities), the aid needs to be dis-
tributed in such a manner that the for-
mula reﬂ  ects the local severity of the 
downturn. In addition, the distribution 
needs to be adjusted to account for the 
local economic trend. If a state has had 
persistently high unemployment because 
of the structure of its local economy, a 
particular economic measure may al-
ready be above the trigger threshold, 
and thus, the onset of a recession might 
have less of an impact on the margin than 
in another jurisdiction where business 
cycle conditions have a disproportionate 
impact on economic activity. The goal 
should be to ameliorate the impact of the 
business cycle, not to support structural 
readjustment of the local economy. 
employment during the recession and the 
state’s relative wealth as measured by per 
capita gross state product, to assess the 
level of aid provided relative to the severity 
of the downturn. The GAO found that 
Alaska, the District of Columbia, and 
Wyoming all experienced employment 
gains during the recession, and yet they 
received substantial ﬁ  scal relief of more 
than $79 per capita. Conversely, states with 
nonfarm employment losses above the 
national average of roughly 1.5%, includ-
ing Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin, only received $34.01 per 
capita in aid.16 
Using the aid
Most of the federal government’s aid to 
counteract the effects of the 1973–75 
For an aid package to be truly stimula-
tive, the federal government needs to 
borrow the funds and the states need 
to use the money to either expand spend-
ing or avoid tax increases. It would also 
be feasible for the federal government 
to borrow the funds but have the states 
use the money to retire debt. While 
this would improve the states’ balance 
sheets, it would not stimulate growth 
in the state government sector. The 
least optimal funding strategy would 
be for the federal government to re-
duce its expenditures or raise taxes to 
fund aid to the states and then for the 
states to use the money to retire debt. 
In this case, the government sector 
would actually contract. 
Conclusion
The evaluations of the federal govern-
ment’s previous aid packages have 
suggested that there is room for im-
provement. In its 2004 assessment of 
the $10 billion dollar Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 
the GAO concluded “from an economic 
perspective, the allocation of relief pay-
ments among the states was less than 
optimal.”17 The primary fault was that 
the aid package was ill-timed. As with 
most aid policies, the effectiveness ulti-
mately lies in the details of how the aid 
package is implemented. 
and 2001 recessions had very few restric-
tions. As such, it was easy for a state to 
substitute federal money for own-source 
revenues. Whether federal money should 
be unrestricted or targeted depends 
largely on the purpose behind the federal 
relief funds. If the goal is to stabilize 
spending across the state government 
sector, unrestricted aid from the federal 
government that can be used as a state 
sees ﬁ  t is appropriate. Unrestricted aid 
can also be spent faster, and the speed 
of getting money into the economy is 
often a goal of this aid. If, however, the 
federal government hopes to support 
speciﬁ  c types of state programs, such as 
Medicaid or education, categorical aid 
increases the accountability for the spend-
ing. Further, the federal government can 
provide the money on a matching funds 
basis that requires the state to maintain 
its contribution to the speciﬁ  c program 
and not allow it to simply withdraw state 
funding and replace it with federal dollars.
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